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a b s t r a c t
Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to generate
a surplus. Yet, the negotiation stage will be reached only if at date 1 both parties pay their respective
transaction costs. We show that the expected total surplus may be larger when at date 1 the parties do
not yet know the size of the surplus that can be generated at date 2. Moreover, joint ownership can be
optimal under incomplete information even when it would be suboptimal under complete information.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm devel-
oped by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
is widely regarded as a major advance in microeconomics.1 The
Grossman–Hart–Moore theory shows that when contracts are in-
complete, ownership matters. Due to contractual incompleteness,
there will be negotiations in the future. While these negotiations
lead to an ex-post efficient outcome, the division of the surplus
depends on the threatpoint which is determined by the owner-
ship structure. Hence, ownership influences the incentives tomake
surplus-enhancing investments.
The property rights approach has been criticized for its focus
on investment incentives. For instance, Moore (2016, p. 12) has
∗ Correspondence to: Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-
Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany. Tel.: +49 221 470 5609.
E-mail address: patrick.schmitz@uni-koeln.de.
1 Andrei Shleifer has recently pointed out that the ‘‘Grossman–Hart incomplete
contracts approach represents perhaps the most influential advance in economic
theory in the last thirty years’’ (see the back cover of Aghion et al., 2016). The
property rights theory has been successfully applied in various fields such as
industrial economics, corporate finance, organizational economics, international
trade, privatization theory, and political economy.
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0/).recently argued that ‘‘Hold-up is important, but looking around
the world, it seems that ex-post inefficiencies are even more
important’’. Similar arguments have been brought forward by
Williamson (2002), who emphasizes that transaction cost eco-
nomics is focused on ex-post inefficiencies.2 In the present paper,
we thus consider a variant of the Grossman–Hart–Moore setup
without investments. Instead, we introduce transaction costs as
modelled by Anderlini and Felli (2006), which may imply that ne-
gotiations do not take place, so ex-post inefficiencies can occur.
Two parties, A and B, can collaborate in order to generate a
surplus V . From an ex-ante point of view, V is a random variable.
Yet, in the first of two scenarios that we will consider, both parties
know the realization of V from the outset. Following Anderlini and
Felli’s (2006) insightful paper, we assume that the negotiations
between the two parties take place only if each party pays its
transaction cost c > 0.3 If the negotiations do not take place
2 See also Hart and Moore (2008, p. 2), who argue that ‘‘the emphasis on non-
contractible ex-ante investments seems overplayed: although such investments are
surely important, it is hard to believe that they are the sole drivers of organizational
form’’.
3 The transaction costs can be interpreted as the time spent ‘preparing’ for
the negotiations. For example, the parties must conceive of a suitable language
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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default payoff, which is determined by the ownership structure.
The second scenario that we will consider is identical to the first
scenario, except that there is incomplete information; i.e., the
realization of V is learned by the parties only after they have
decided whether to pay their transaction costs.
At first sight, one might guess that incomplete information can
only be harmful. Yet, this is not the case. Specifically, suppose that
there is joint ownership; i.e., the parties’ default payoffs are zero
(cf. Hart, 1995). Suppose party A has bargaining power λ ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, when the negotiations take place, party A gets λV and party
B gets (1− λ)V . Party A is willing to pay its transaction costs only
if c ≤ λV , while party B is willing to pay its transaction costs only
if c ≤ (1− λ)V . If λ = 1/2, the negotiations take place whenever
2c ≤ V , which is efficient. Yet, when in the wording of Anderlini
and Felli (2006) there is a sufficiently strong ‘mismatch’ between
the (unequal) bargaining powers and the (equal) transaction costs
(e.g., if λ < c/V ), then an ex-post inefficiency may occur (the
negotiations do not take place even though V − 2c > 0). Now
observe that under incomplete information, the parties pay their
transaction costs if c ≤ λE[V ] and c ≤ (1 − λ)E[V ]. Since
c/E[V ] < λ < c/V may hold for some realizations of V , from
an ex-ante point of view the expected total surplus can be larger
under incomplete information. Under complete information, the
parties may sometimes ‘‘know too much’’ for the negotiations to
take place.
We also consider sole ownership by party A or party B, such
that the owner canmake a positive profit (smaller than V ) without
collaboration. We will show that under incomplete information
joint ownership can yield a strictly larger expected total surplus
than sole ownership, even when sole ownership would be optimal
under complete information.
Related literature. To the best of my knowledge, Müller and
Schmitz (2016) is the only paper so far in which transaction
costs as modelled by Anderlini and Felli (2006) have been
introduced into theGrossman–Hart–Moore property rights theory.
However, in contrast to the present paper, Müller and Schmitz
(2016) do not consider incomplete information (instead, they
focus on the interplay of transaction costs and investments).4
The present paper also contributes to a growing literature which
shows that joint ownership can be optimal in variants of the
Grossman–Hart–Moore setup. See Gattai and Natale (2016) for a
recent survey of this literature.5
2. The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, A and B, who at date t = 2
can negotiate about whether to collaborate. If the parties agree
to collaborate, they can generate a date-2 surplus V . We assume
that V ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable with cumulative distribution
function F(V ). If the negotiations do not take place or if no
agreement is reached, at date t = 2 each party i ∈ {A, B} obtains
only its default payoff doi ≥ 0, where o ∈ {A, B, J} denotes
to describe the states of nature, they must gather information about the legal
environment, and they have to spend time arranging a way to meet (for more
details, see Anderlini and Felli, 2006, pp. 226–228).
4 See also Schmitz (2006) for an extension of the Grossman–Hart–Moore theory
to the case of asymmetric information. In this model, private information can be
beneficial because information rents may enhance investment incentives.
5 The Grossman–Hart–Moore theory has been criticized because their standard
model cannot explain joint ownership. For example, Holmström (1999) has stressed
that joint ventures have always been an important part of the corporate landscape.
The close relationship between the notion of joint ownership in the property
rights theory and characteristics of joint ventures in practice has been empirically
confirmed by Gattai and Natale (2013).Table 1
The parties’ date-2 default payoffs.
doA d
o
B
o = A εV 0
o = B 0 εV
o = J 0 0
the ownership structure (see Table 1). Specifically, if there is sole
ownership by party i ∈ {A, B}, the owner’s default payoff is εV with
ε ∈ (0, 1), while the non-owner’s default payoff is zero. Hence,
the owner canmake a positive profit, but collaborationwould yield
a larger surplus. In accordance with the property rights approach
(Hart, 1995), joint ownership (o = J) means that each party has
veto power such that both parties’ default payoffs are zero.
Note that due to the symmetry of the default payoffs, under
A-ownership and B-ownership the total surplus will be the same.
Hence, in what follows we focus on the comparison between sole
ownership and joint ownership.6
2.1. Scenario I: Complete information
We consider two scenarios. In Scenario I, there is complete
information (see Fig. 1). Hence, the parties know the realization of
V from the outset. At date 1, each party decides whether to incur
transaction costs c > 0.7 Let xA ∈ {0, 1} denote party A’s decision
and let xB ∈ {0, 1} denote party B’s decision. As in Anderlini and
Felli (2006), the negotiation stage is reached only if both parties
pay their transaction costs (xA = xB = 1).
If the date-2 negotiations take place, then the outcome of the
negotiations is given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution,
where λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes party A’s bargaining power and the
threatpoint is given by the parties’ default payoffs. Thus, under
ownership structure o, party A ’s payoff is
uoA(V ) =

doA + λ(V − doA − doB)− c if xA = xB = 1,
doA − c if xA = 1, xB = 0,
doA otherwise,
and party B’s payoff is
uoB(V )
=

doB + (1− λ)(V − doA − doB)− c if xA = xB = 1,
doB − c if xA = 0, xB = 1,
doB otherwise.
If a party does not pay its transaction cost, then it is the best
reply for the other party also not to pay its transaction cost.
However, if c ≤ λ(V − doA − doB) and c ≤ (1 − λ)(V − doA − doB),
then there is a second equilibrium in which both parties pay their
transaction costs. Following Anderlini and Felli (2006), we assume
that the latter equilibrium is played whenever it exists, because it
Pareto-dominates the former equilibrium.8
Under sole ownership, both parties pay their transaction costs
whenever c ≤ min{λ, 1−λ}(1−ε)V . Under joint ownership, both
6 It is straightforward to generalize the model by assuming that under A-
ownership partyA’s default payoff is εAV , while under B-ownership party B’s default
payoff is εBV , where εA ≠ εB .
7 We focus on the symmetric case to simplify the exposition. It is straightforward
to generalize the model such that party A’s transaction costs are cA and party B’s
transaction costs are cB .
8 We thus assume that the parties coordinate on Pareto-perfect equilibria
(cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Alternatively, as has also been argued by Anderlini
and Felli (2006),we could assume that the parties have to pay their transaction costs
sequentially (so there would be no multiplicity of equilibria and the same results
would be obtained as under the assumption of Pareto perfection).
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The expected total surplus levels So can thus be characterized as
follows.
Proposition 1. Consider Scenario I. The expected total surplus is
SA = SB
=

 1
c
min{λ,1−λ}(1−ε)
(V − 2c)dF(V )
+
 c
min{λ,1−λ}(1−ε)
0
εVdF(V ) if c ≤ min{λ, 1− λ}(1− ε),
εE[V ] otherwise,
under sole ownership and
S J =

 1
c
min{λ,1−λ}
(V − 2c)dF(V ) if c ≤ min{λ, 1− λ},
0 otherwise,
under joint ownership.
2.2. Scenario II: Incomplete information
Next, consider Scenario II. This scenario is identical to Scenario
I, except that there is incomplete information when the parties
decide whether to pay their transaction costs (see Fig. 2).9
In this case, party A’s payoff reads
u˜oA =

E[doA] + λE[V − doA − doB] − c if xA = xB = 1,
E[doA] − c if xA = 1, xB = 0,
E[doA] otherwise,
and party B’s payoff is
u˜oB =

E[doB] + (1− λ)E[V − doA − doB] − c if xA = xB = 1,
E[doB] − c if xA = 0, xB = 1,
E[doB] otherwise.
Under sole ownership, the parties pay the transaction costs
whenever c ≤ min{λ, 1 − λ}(1 − ε)E[V ]. Under joint
ownership, the parties pay the transaction costs whenever c ≤
min{λ, 1 − λ}E[V ]. Thus, the expected total surplus levels S˜o can
be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2. Consider Scenario II. The expected total surplus is
S˜A = S˜B =

E[V ] − 2c if c ≤ min{λ, 1− λ}(1− ε)E[V ],
εE[v] otherwise,
9 Note that the realization of V is learned by the parties only after the bargaining
stage. We could alternatively assume that the parties learn the realization of V
between dates 1 and 2, which would yield the same expected surplus levels.under sole ownership and
S˜ J =

E[V ] − 2c if c ≤ min{λ, 1− λ}E[V ],
0 otherwise,
under joint ownership.
3. Implications
First, we explore the optimality of joint ownership for a given
information structure.
If λ→ 0 or λ→ 1, then regardless of the information structure
the expected total surplus is zero under joint ownership, while it
is εE[v] under sole ownership. Hence, joint ownership cannot be
optimal if the ‘mismatch’ between the transaction costs and the
bargaining power is too strong.
Now consider the case λ = 1/2 and c < (1− ε)E[V ]/2. In this
case, according to Proposition 1
SA − S J =
 1
2c
1−ε
(V − 2c)dF(V )+
 2c
1−ε
0
εVdF(V )
−
 1
2c
(V − 2c)dF(V )
=
 2c
1−ε
2c
[εV − (V − 2c)] dF(V )+
 2c
0
εVdF(V ) > 0,
so joint ownership is suboptimal given complete information. Yet,
Proposition 2 implies that in the case under consideration, if there
is incomplete information, the expected total surplus is E[V ] −
2c regardless of the ownership structure. Hence, joint ownership
is among the optimal ownership structures. Moreover, if λ ≠
1/2, then under incomplete information joint ownership can even
yield a strictly larger expected total surplus than sole ownership,
while under complete information sole ownership would still be
optimal. As an illustration, see Fig. 3. Observe that under complete
information joint ownership is optimal only for small ranges of
the bargaining power λ, while under incomplete information joint
ownership is optimal for larger parameter ranges.10
Corollary 1. (i) If λ→ 0 or λ→ 1, then sole ownership is optimal,
regardless of the information structure.
10 Our finding that joint ownership can be optimal under incomplete information
even when it would be suboptimal under complete information is in line with
Pisano’s (1989) observation that joint ventures are particularly prevalent in the
context of R&D activities (where incomplete information is likely to play an
important role). Note that payoff uncertainty also plays an important role for
the optimal ownership structure in Hart’s (2009) framework. While his model
crucially relies on behavioural assumptions, the present paper illustrates that payoff
uncertainty can also play an important role in property rights models based on
standard theory.
36 P.W. Schmitz / Economics Letters 145 (2016) 33–37Fig. 3. Expected total surplus levels in the case F(v) = v, ε = 1/3, and c = 0.15.Fig. 4. Expected total surplus levels in the case F(v) = v, ε = 1/3, and c = 0.06.(ii) For intermediate values of λ, joint ownership can be optimal,
regardless of the information structure.Moreover, joint ownership
can be optimal under incomplete information even when it is
suboptimal under complete information.
Next, we investigate the effects of the information structure for
a given ownership structure.
If λ → 0 or λ → 1, then under sole ownership the expected
total surplus is εE[V ], while under joint ownership it is zero,
regardless of the information structure. Moreover, if λ = 1/2 and
c < (1− ε)E[V ]/2, then
SA − S˜A =
 1
2c
1−ε
(V − 2c)dF(V )+
 2c
1−ε
0
εVdF(V )
−
 1
0
(V − 2c)dF(V )
=
 2c
1−ε
0
[2c − (1− ε)V ] dF(V ) > 0,
and
S J − S˜ J =
 1
2c
(V − 2c)dF(V )−
 1
0
(V − 2c)dF(V )
=
 2c
0
[2c − V ] dF(V ) > 0.
Hence, in this case the expected total surplus is larger under
complete information than under incomplete information. Yet, the
opposite result may also hold; i.e., the parties may ‘‘know toomuch’’. If under sole ownership λ = c
(1−ε)E[V ] < 1/2, then
SA − S˜A =
 1
E[V ]
(V − 2c)dF(V )+
 E[V ]
0
εVdF(V )
−
 1
0
(V − 2c)dF(V )
=
 E[V ]
0
[2c − (1− ε)V ] dF(V ).
This expression is negative if c is sufficiently small. Similarly, if
under joint ownership λ = c/E[V ] < 1/2, then
S J − S˜ J =
 1
E[V ]
(V − 2c)dF(V )−
 1
0
(V − 2c)dF(V )
=
 E[V ]
0
[2c − V ] dF(V ),
which is negative for small transaction costs. Fig. 4 illustrates
the fact that the expected total surplus can be strictly larger
under incomplete information than under complete information.
This effect occurs for larger parameter ranges when there is joint
ownership.
Corollary 2. (i) If λ → 0 or λ → 1, then for a given ownership
structure the expected total surplus does not depend on the
information structure.
(ii) If λ = 1/2, then the expected total surplus is larger under com-
plete information than under incomplete information, regardless
of the ownership structure.
(iii) If λ ≠ 1/2, then the expected total surplus can be larger un-
der incomplete information than under complete information, re-
gardless of the ownership structure.
P.W. Schmitz / Economics Letters 145 (2016) 33–37 37Acknowledgement
The author gratefully acknowledges financial support under
the Institutional Strategy of the University of Cologne within the
German Excellence Initiative (Hans-Kelsen-Prize 2015).
References
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Legros, P., Zingales, L., 2016. The Impact of Incomplete
Contracts on Economics. Oxford University Press.
Anderlini, L., Felli, L., 2006. Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase
theorem. Econ. J. 116, 223–245.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press.
Gattai, V., Natale, P., 2013. What makes a joint venture: Micro-evidence from Sino-
Italian contracts. Rev. Financ. Econ. 22, 194–205.
Gattai, V., Natale, P., 2016. A new Cinderella story: Joint ventures and the property
rights theory of the firm. J. Econ. Surv. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joes.12135.Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of
vertical and lateral integration. J. Polit. Econ. 94, 691–719.
Hart, O.D., 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hart, O., 2009. Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points. Quart. J. Econ. 124,
267–300.
Hart, O.D., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Polit. Econ.
98, 1119–1158.
Hart, O., Moore, J., 2008. Contracts as reference points. Quart. J. Econ. 123, 1–48.
Holmström, B., 1999. The firm as a subeconomy. J. Law Econ. Organ. 15, 74–102.
Moore, J., 2016. Introductory remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986). In: Aghion, P.,
et al. (Eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics. Oxford
University Press.
Müller, D., Schmitz, P.W., 2016. Transaction costs and the property rights approach
to the theory of the firm. Europ. Econ. Rev. 87, 92–107.
Pisano, G.P., 1989. Using equity participation to support exchange: Evidence from
the biotechnology industry. J. Law Econ. Organ. 5, 109–126.
Schmitz, P.W., 2006. Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property
rights approach. Amer. Econ. Rev. 96, 422–434.
Williamson, O.E., 2002. The theory of the firm as governance structure: From choice
to contract. J. Econ. Perspect. 16, 171–195.
